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THE LITTLE ROCK CRISIS: A CONSTITUTIONAL IN-
TERPRETATION. By Tony Freyer.t Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press. 1984. Pp. xii, 186. $27.95. 
Martin Shapiro 2 
Over the last few decades, social scientists have written numer-
ous "impact" or "compliance" studies that seek to measure the ac-
tual effect on human conduct of changes in the law. Many of these 
studies are about the impact of Supreme Court decisions on school 
prayer, criminal procedure, and desegregation.3 Another familiar 
genre seeks to calculate the effects of various changes in criminal 
sanctions, such as the introduction of mandatory incarceration for 
drunk driving or the abolition and reintroduction of the death pen-
alty. 4 All of these efforts involve major methodological problems. 
Complex organizations (like police departments, schools, and polit-
ical parties) respond to changes in their environment through a se-
ries of time staged adjustments that generate a relatively permanent 
and stable change in the behavior of the organizations only after a 
considerable intermediate period of confused experimentation. Sup-
pose, for instance, that one wants to measure the impact of a 
"point" change in the law, like the passage of a new statute or the 
announcement of a new constitutional doctrine by the Supreme 
Court. Any study done shortly after the event is likely to catch the 
observed organizations at their stage of transitional confusion 
rather than at the stage of final adjustment which would be the most 
socially significant measure of the impact of the legal change. Ide-
ally, then, scholars should wait for the dust to settle. 
On the other hand, from the point of view of the social scientist 
as scientist, the point change in law constitutes the independent va-
riable or cause whose effects he or she seeks to measure by observ-
ing changes in the dependent variables, that is, the behavior of the 
observed organizations. The gravest danger to such a scientific en-
deavor is the dreaded intervening (or "exogenous") variable. Be-
sides the cause under consideration, other independent causes may 
intervene so that it is impossible to tell which cause created which 
effect. After the new drunk driving law is passed, a new head of the 
I. Associate Professor of History and Law, University of Alabama. 
2. Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. 
3. E.g., T. BECKER & M. FEELEY, THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (2d 
ed. 1973); S. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME CoURT: SoME PER-
SPECTIVES (1970). 
4. See CoMPLIANCE AND THE LAW (S. Krislov, K. Boyum, J. Clark, R. Shaefer, & S. 
White ed. 1972). 
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highway patrol may be appointed. Which event caused more drunk 
drivers to end up in jail? To avoid this problem of extra independ-
ent variables, impact should be measured very soon after the cause 
under observation, before there has been time for other independent 
variables to intervene. 
Thus hair trigger impact studies give us relative rigorous analy-
ses of relatively trivial matters; and delayed studies give us less reli-
able inferences about more significant issues. Because of this 
paradox social scientific impact and compliance studies have not 
contributed greatly to the development of social theory, nor have 
they helped policy makers much, except in buttressing a truism 
hammered home by nearly all scholarly examination of the political 
and social world: nothing ever turns out exactly as anticipated. 
Professor Tony Freyer has written an impact study titled The 
Little Rock Crisis. As a historian he need not, and does not, trouble 
himself with the social science paradox. He is not primarily con-
cerned with building a general theory of how law changes society. 
For him all the awkward organizational transitions and the inter-
vening variables are parts of the rich multicause, multieffect stew 
that a historian must digest in appreciating a particular historical 
event in all its uniqueness. While, almost to the point of perversity, 
he does not cite the large literature of Supreme Court impact stud-
ies, he is the beneficiary of much of that literature. As if he were a 
student carefully organizing his paper to illustrate points made by 
others before him, he shows that when, why, how, and by whom a 
Supreme Court decision is obeyed is determined by a broad array of 
factors ranging from demographics to the structure of federal, state, 
and local governments, the nature of the dominant political party or 
parties, the complex internal needs and interrelations of interest 
groups and, probably most important, the motives, knowledge, and 
ideologies of the individuals who hold key places in the decision-
making structure that decides to obey or not to obey. That he does 
all this without an enormous scholarly paraphernalia of footnotes 
and commentary concerning earlier research will be a blessing to 
those who care more about what happened in Little Rock than 
what has happened in social science. Professor Freyer either wears 
his learning lightly or has taken in a great deal by osmosis without 
himself quite knowing where he got it. In any event, he offers a 
sophisticated, if sketchy, catalogue of the local political factors that 
contributed to the Little Rock crisis. 
If Freyer is functioning as a historian, rather than a social sci-
entist, just what sort of history is this book? As Professor Freyer 
tells us in his introduction, someone else is engaged in a massive 
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study of the Little Rock crisis. The Little Rock Crisis contains only 
176 pages of text and notes. It tells only the bare minimum about 
what happened in Washington. It provides only an outline of even 
the Arkansas events and often provides only cursory support for its 
conclusions about them. Against the standard canons of historical 
scholarship, it must be counted a minor work. 
So much for that favorite pastime of book reviewers, criticizing 
a book for what it is not. This book is not social science and it is 
not history, at least not major, scholarly history. It is, however, a 
very good basic sketch of what happened at Little Rock. As such, it 
serves two extremely important functions. First, at least for begin-
ners, it provides an incredibly clear and useful illustration of the 
point that law is not obeyed simply because a legislature or a court 
authoritatively announces it, but instead depends for obedience on 
an extremely complex set of factors that are essentially political, 
many of which have little or no obvious connection with the sub-
stance of the law being announced. Secondly, this book provides a 
fair and realistic assessment of the actions of Governor Faubus who 
has become one of the demons of modem American folklore.s Pro-
fessor Freyer shows that Faubus was one of that long string of pop-
ulist Southern Democrats whose ambitions for social justice became 
tragically entangled with the racial conflicts endemic to the very 
poor whose lot in life they seek to improve. So, as a "trade" book 
rather than a scholarly one, The Little Rock Crisis has some out-
standing merits and deserves to be read by those who do not special-
ize in the intersection of law and politics or the history of race 
relations. 
Beyond providing these signal services to that wonderful crea-
ture, the literature lay reader, this book makes another contribu-
tion. Its subtitle is "A Constitutional Interpretation." 
[Everyone] approached racial justice ... in terms of deference to constitutional 
symbolism . . . . The focus on legalism . . . had the effect of confusing means with 
ends. Obedience to law itself-not the substantive value of equal educational op-
portunity-became the basis for both compliance and resistance . . . . [M]any gov-
ernment leaders expected . . . Americans . . . to accept minority rights as a matter 
of compulsion rather than consent . . . . [D]ependence on [force] obscured the 
moral principle at issue. 
. . . [F]ocus on the rule-of-law value led inevitably to controversy over the 
nature of judicial power in a representative democracy. 
[J]udicial lawmaking could foster public acceptance of desegregation . . . . 
But the chief result of . . . [the] interaction [between legal process and political 
interest] was that questions of moral principle became absorbed in a confrontation 
5. The most dramatic example of this folklore is Charles Mingus's Fables of Faubus, 
Atlantis Records. 
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over the scope, character, and legitimacy of federal authority. This process in tum 
narrowed the reach of the constitutional principle established in Brown .... [T]he 
complex interplay of interests, democracy, law, and values produced a policy of 
principled but conservative moderation. 
Individual and community conduct changed . . . because of judicial activism 
and democratic processes .... Changes were always in the direction of less and 
slower . . . desegregation .... The ultimate impact . . . was . . . the integration of 
a mere handful of black young people . . . . 6 
The conclusion that constitutional principles passed through 
the incremental decison-making processes characteristic of our pol-
yarchic, 1 democratic process lead only to small changes in policy 
outputs and even smaller or problematic changes in fundamental 
social values and structures is in line with those of dozens of other 
Supreme Court impact studies. And the more general conclusion 
that the judicial function involves both law and politics has, of 
course, been the mainstay of the political jurisprudence literature 
for many years.s So at the level of positive description this book is 
hardly startling but is a useful addition to the evidence. 
It is not quite clear whether Professor Freyer thinks that what 
he has described was inevitable, desirable, or both. Although 
Freyer is a historian, he has at least one trait in common with many 
academic lawyers: he would prefer a utopia in which moral change 
occurs solely as a result of discourse about moral principles.9 He 
does not say how he wants constitutional change to occur in the real 
world. 
What he does say, however, provides a jumping off place for 
two quite different normative theories of constitutional change. 
Freyer does pretty clearly label racial desegregation as a good moral 
principle and he frets at the tendency of the legal and political pro-
cess to compromise this good principle in its search for acceptable 
incremental, polyarchical, consensual means. One normative solu-
tion is to reject the means. There is now some evidence to suggest 
that if we reject incremental and essentially consensual tactics and 
instead adopt relatively total, coercive tactics for achieving desegre-
gation, our moral end will be less compromised and more fully 
6. T. FREYER, THE LITILE ROCK CRISIS 172-75 (1984) (emphasis in original). 
7. The term polyarchy refers to a system of government in which the power of deci-
sion rests not so much with the mass of individual voters or a close, single political elite as 
with a complex congeries of groups, interests, and individual participants. See R. DAHL, 
PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (1967). 
8. See Stumpf, Shapiro, Danelski, Sarat, & O'Brien, Whither Political Jurisprudence: 
A Symposium, 36 W. PoL. Q. 533 (1983). 
9. See Shapiro, Fathers and Sons: The Coun, the Commentators, and the Search for 
Values, in THE BURGER CoURT: THE CoUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 218 (V. Blasi 
ed. 1983). 
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achieved.w Draconian court orders including busing and interdis-
trict remedies to cut off white flight, the club of contempt, judicial 
takeover of administration through masters, the threat to cut off 
federal funding from state and local governments not totally depen-
dent on such funding, strictly enforced quotas and timetables-if 
the end is just why not adopt these means? Desegregation is a local 
issue, and so long as the central government exercises a properly 
Machiavellian timing, the locales can be knocked off a few at a time. 
No single locale has the power to really resist a full onslaught of the 
central government and each locale will be indifferent to the plight 
of others both before its own crisis has come and after its crisis has 
passed. A lot of "properly timed" coercion in the cause of racial 
equality is a damned good thing, as Ronald Dworkin and others 
have told us, and it may well work. 
In short, when Professor Freyer says that the emphasis in the 
Little Rock crisis on law and thus on coercion had the unfortunate 
consequence of shifting attention away from moral concerns, he 
may be speaking a half or very distorted truth. The real truth may 
be that what had unfortunate moral consequences was not the 
choice of legal coercion but the continued treatment of that choice 
as problematic-the continued yearning to elicit consent. A whole-
hearted, absolute dedication to coercion in the cause of racial justice 
might have been the best path to moral progress. 
Of course, to be absolutely confident of this normative theory 
of constitutional change, we must be confident that the end or value 
chosen is indeed both a good and what political theorists call a "pri-
ority good." For those who question either the goodness or the pri-
ority of the goal of racial equality, a second and quite different 
normative theory may emerge. As Freyer points out, J. Skelly 
Wright and company are quite confident that their moral principle 
is the moral principle either in the sense of being objectively correct 
or being the principle chosen by the Constitution or being the prin-
ciple in which the American people really believe or being the prin-
ciple in which the American people would believe if they got 
involved in a true moral discourse about principles, or preferably in 
all of these senses. But what if they are wrong? What if the goal of 
racial equality is not in any of these senses a true goal or is only one 
among many true and potentially conflicting goals? It may appear 
to some that the goal of racial equality, particularly when coupled 
with the demand for immediate attainment through high levels of 
judicial and bureaucratic coercion, constitutes not a universal, first 
10. See ]. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
AND ScHOOL DESEGREGATION (1984). 
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priority value but the ideology of a particular liberal, intellectual 
elite that at a particular moment in American history found itself in 
control of the judiciary, the federal bureaucracy, and the mass me-
dia. From this perspective, one moral of Professor Freyer's story 
may be that this elite foolishly squandered its opportunities. In-
stead of being sucked into the incremental, polyarchic swamp, it 
should have gone for broke, employed the maximum coercion at its 
disposal and achieved its goals. 
An alternative moral, however, is that Freyer's characteriza-
tion of the problem is dead wrong. If we believe that government 
by the consent of the governed is just as fundamental as racial 
equality, then Little Rock is not an instance in which a mistaken 
statement of the issues in terms of government authority rather than 
race led to a moral error. Nor is it one in which a resort to incre-
mental democratic processes led to the erosion of moral principle. 
Instead it is one in which whatever compromise occurred was the 
result of the collision of two equally weighty and ultimate moral 
principles, racial equality and the consent of the governed. If we do 
not assume a moral universe in which moral principles are arranged 
in a neat hierarchy assuring that they can always be harmonized by 
consulting their relative importance, or if we do not assume that the 
choice by the liberal intellectual elite of racial equality as the abso-
lutely trump value represents an ultimate truth rather than merely 
the choice of a particular group, then the significance of Little Rock 
is that it presents the moral dilemma long ago posed by Herbert 
Wechsler: that freedom of association is a constitutional value as 
weighty as racial equality. 
The dilemma may be more vividly appreciated once we under-
stand that, of all our governmental institutions, the public school 
(with compulsory attendance) is the most totalitarian and coercive. 
It rips children from the bosom of their families in order to incul-
cate in them whatever the state designates as truth in a setting in 
which the state dictates exactly who shall be with whom in exactly 
what social relationships. Where this massive and detailed coercion 
is employed not in the best interest of the child but in the best inter-
est of some other child or in the interest of what the state has cho-
sen to designate as social justice, the coercion is much more severe. 
Perhaps Professor Freyer's story implied that if there had been 
a full public discourse on the moral principle of racial equality the 
people of Little Rock would have freely consented to school integra-
tion, thus resolving the dilemma and avoiding the compromise of 
any moral principle. What if, however, a substantial proportion of 
them decided, after a full moral discourse, that they would not con-
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sent? Do we have a right to ignore consent of the governed as an 
(an, not the) ultimate value simply by labelling their decision as 
morally obtuse or selfish or wrong? 
Perhaps Little Rock is an example of a terribly embarrassing 
but frequent event: that public discourse on moral issues does not 
produce the moral result that liberal intellectuals know to be right. 
The Supreme Court had initiated a public moral discourse in Brown 
and as the public became more and more engaged in that discourse 
in Little Rock and elsewhere, the public came to reject, not the 
principle, but the priority initially assigned to it by the Court. In 
short, Little Rock may be a perfect example of what the liberal 
proceduralist wing of constitutional interpretation says it wants, 
namely a public discourse initiated and guided by courts leading to 
a choice of policies consonant with public values. II The trouble is 
that this particular discourse led to a choice of values and policies 
that the liberals don't like. Thus it becomes necessary to character-
ize it as a discourse that went astray, that lost its focus on moral 
questions and so reached a poor moral result. Those who are not 
liberal may prefer to characterize Little Rock as a true moral dis-
course that brought to light conflict between the ultimate values of 
consent and racial equality and yielded precisely that moral com-
promise which is to be expected and even applauded when two ulti-
mate moral values collide. 
THE BURDEN OF BROWN. By Raymond Wolters.1 
Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press. 1984. Pp. 
346. $24.95. 
Elaine W. Shoben 2 
The Burden of Brown by Raymond Wolters is a long book with 
a very short message: integration is bad, but desegregation is not. 
The distinction between the two is crucial to Wolters's analysis. 
Desegregation is the prohibition of officially sanctioned separation 
of the races. Integration, on the other hand, is the compelled mix-
ing of the races for the sake of mixing. The "burden" of Brown v. 
Board of Education,J according to Wolters, is that the Supreme 
11. Fiss, The Supreme Court. 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. 
L. REv. 1 (1979). 
l. Professor of History, University of Delaware. 
2. Professor of Law, University of Illinois. 
3. 347 u.s. 483 (1954). 
